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Introduction
This paper revisits a question with a long tradition in development economics. What explains industrialization, i.e., the decline of agriculture's share in GDP and the corresponding rise of manufacturing (and later services)? Why do we observe such substantial di¤erences in levels of industrialization around the world?
The literature on structural change has proposed a number of theories to explain these phenomena. The most in ‡uential approaches focus on di¤erences in the income elasticity of demand across sectors (e.g., Murphy et al. (1989b) ; Kongsamut et al. (2001) ), sector-biased productivity growth (e.g., Ngai and Pissarides (2007) ), or a combination of both (e.g., Caselli and Coleman (2001) ; Duarte and Restuccia (2010) ). Traditionally, these approaches have analyzed closed-economy models. More recently, several authors have provided extensions to open-economy settings and have shown that additional forces, such as comparative advantage, become relevant in such models and can substantially alter the results from the closed-economy literature. 1 While analyzing the phenomenon of industrialization in open-economy models seems natural in today's integrated world economy, it is important to realize that trade is not costless and that distance and thus the geographic position of countries still matters. Indeed, a large literature in international trade and economic geography has highlighted the links between industrial specialization, trade and geography. For example, authors such as Krugman (1980) , Krugman and Helpman (1985) , Davis and Weinstein (2003) or , to name but a few, have shown how market size and relative geographic position shape industrial specialization patterns. Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Fieler (2011) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) , among others, have used fully parameterized multi-country models with trade costs to explain observed trade patterns and to quantify the gains from trade.
In this paper, we propose a quantitative framework for the analysis of industrialization in which countries are integrated through trade, but where trade is not costless and geographic position matters. Building on a set of theoretical mechanisms well known in the trade and economic geography literature, we construct a multi-country model with costly trade augmented with a key ingredient of structural change models: non-homothetic preferences that lead to an income elasticity of demand for manufacturing higher than for agriculture. We argue that such a framework is useful to understand two important empirical regularities, and provides a better …t to cross-sectional data on manufacturing shares than frameworks which ignore the role of economic geography.
The …rst observation that motivates our choice of framework is that proximity to foreign sources of demand seems to matter for industrialization. For example, it has long been noted that Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan not only bene…tted from an outward-oriented trade policy but also close proximity to the large Japanese market. A cursory look at the data suggests that distance to foreign markets has a more general relevance: Figure 1 plots the manufacturing share in GDP against the minimum distance to the European Union, Japan and the U.S. for a cross-section of developing countries in 2000. 2 The …gure shows that developing economies close to one of these main markets of the world have higher levels of industrialization as measured by manufacturing's share in GDP.
Our second observation is that a standard proxy for comparative advantage in agriculture, labor productivity in agriculture relative to manufacturing, is either positively or not at all correlated with manufacturing shares in the developing world. Figure 2 plots these two variables against each other for a cross-section of developing countries for the year 2000. 3 The …tted line has a positive, albeit statistically insigni…cant slope. As we show in our more detailed econometric analysis in Section 2, extending the sample to include more countries and years leaves this positive correlation intact and actually makes it statistically signi…cant as well.
By construction, the …rst of these two facts cannot be explained by closed-economy models of industrialization. But it also sits uneasily with open-economy models with free trade, in which geographic position is irrelevant. In fact, both observations arise naturally in a model nesting non-homothetic preferences in a multi-country comparative-advantage trade model with positive but …nite trade costs. In the model we propose below, developing countries closer to foreign sources of demand will experience higher demand for both the agricultural and manufacturing goods they produce than more distant countries, ceteris paribus. Following contributions to the international trade and economic geography literature (e.g., Hanson and Xiang (2004) or Murata (2008) ), we outline conditions under which this translates into higher manufacturing shares in GDP. Most importantly, higher overall demand will lead to higher wages which, in the presence of non-homothetic preferences combined with positive trade costs, will shift local production towards the manufacturing sector.
This e¤ect is further reinforced if manufactured products are more di¤erentiated than agricultural products. Trade costs for agricultural products also hamper the comparative-advantage mechanism put forward by free-trade models. High agricultural productivity leads to higher wages which, again because of the combination of agricultural trade costs and non-homothetic preferences, leads countries to specialize in manufacturing (we call this the "relative-demand e¤ect"of agricultural productivity). The standard comparative-advantage e¤ect, which would drive specialization patterns in the opposite direction, is also present but can be overcompensated by the relative-demand e¤ect for intermediate levels of trade costs. 2 We use the Netherlands as the approximate geographic centre of the European Union in Figure 1 . Developing countries are de…ned as countries belonging to the income categories "low", "lower middle" and "upper middle" published by the World Bank (corresponding to less than 9,265 USD in 1999) . The simple OLS regression underlying the …tted line in Figure 1 yields a negative slope coe¢ cient which is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. 3 Developing countries are de…ned as in footnote 2. Labor productivity is measured as value added per worker in agriculture and manufacturing, respectively, where value added is corrected for cross-country price di¤erences using sector-speci…c PPP exchange rates (also see Section 2 and Appendix B) . This is the proxy of choice in many studies of Ricardian comparative advantage, e.g. Golub and Hsieh (2000) .
Having shown that our model can, in principle, explain our stylized facts, we proceed to a calibration of our model based on data from 107 developed and developing countries for the year 2000. The purpose of this calibration is threefold.
First, we show that the model also matches our stylized facts for empirically plausible parameter values. We choose parameters to match international trade and expenditure data, and demonstrate that our calibrated model generates the same positive correlations observed in the data between access to foreign markets and comparative advantage in agriculture, on the one hand, and manufacturing shares, on the other hand. Crucially, this is not true when we constrain our trade cost estimates to be equal to zero ('free trade') or in…nitely high ('autarky'), or when we change parameter values to eliminate the non-homotheticity from the preferences in our model. Secondly, we show that allowing for non-homotheticity and positive but …nite levels of trade costs also improves the model's predictive power (in terms of matching observed and predicted GDP shares of manufacturing relative to agriculture) as opposed to autarky and free trade, or compared to models without non-homotheticity in demand.
Finally, having demonstrated the empirical relevance of our calibrated model, we use it to perform a number of counterfactual experiments. In a …rst set of experiments, we measure how the impact of increases in agricultural productivity on manufacturing activity depends on a country's access to foreign markets. Interestingly, we …nd that the potential deindustrializing comparative advantage e¤ect of such increases is overcompensated by the relative demand e¤ect highlighted above for almost all countries in our calibrated model. In a second set of experiments, we compare the impact of global and regional reductions in trade barriers on levels of industrialization.
While global reductions lead to stronger increases in real income and thus (via non-homothetic preferences) to higher levels of manufacturing activity, they also drive countries to specialize according to their comparative advantage. This lowers manufacturing shares in countries with relatively high agricultural productivity. On the other hand, regional reductions in trade barriers do not raise income levels by as much, but the comparative advantage e¤ect of such reductions is also more muted. This is because, empirically, di¤erences in comparative advantage tend to be smaller across neighbouring countries.
Our paper is related to two sets of contributions in the literature. The …rst is the literature on industrialization and structural change already discussed above. Within this literature, our paper relates most closely to approaches relying on di¤erences in the income elasticity of demand across sectors for explaining structural change (e.g., Murphy et al. (1989b) ; Kongsamut et al. (2001) ). We note, however, that our stylized facts also cannot be easily accounted for in existing theoretical frameworks based on sector-biased productivity growth such as the ones cited above.
We also draw on a large literature in international trade and economic geography concerned with the e¤ects of comparative advantage and relative location on specialization patterns in multi-country frameworks with trade costs. For example, the …rst of our stylized facts directly echoes the empirical …nding from the literature on home-market e¤ects that the geographical distribution of demand matters for local production patterns (e.g., Davis and Weinstein, 2003) .
The explanation we provide for our empirical …ndings is also based on a number of well-known 4 theoretical mechanisms. For example, analyze home-market e¤ects in a multiple-location setup with trade costs. Hanson and Xiang (2004) show that industries with more di¤erentiated products tend to be more concentrated in large countries than industries with less di¤erentiated products. Epifani and Gancia (2006) derive a similar result in models with increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and variable markups, in which the larger the size of the market, the higher the specialization in industries with high product di¤erentiation.
There are also many trade models with non-homotheticities on the demand side. 4 Simplifying this literature in a rather crude way, with non-homothetic preferences international di¤erences in income and income distribution a¤ect relative demand patterns; these have an e¤ect on trade patterns by a¤ecting relative excess demands (for given production structures) and by biasing the production structures of countries towards their high-demand industries (in the presence of trade costs). In Markusen (1986) , for example, rich trading partners consume and specialize in industries subject to increasing returns (that is, manufacturing) and as a result more North-North (intra-industry) trade takes place with higher incomes or with larger degrees of non-homotheticity in preferences. Mitra and Trindade (2005) show how non-homothetic preferences combined with di¤erences in income distribution can revert patterns of comparative advantage in classic trade models; in general, however, consumption and specialization patterns run in parallel in the data, which suggests the need to introduce trade costs in demand-driven trade models. In Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) , a model with trade costs, richer countries specialize in goods with higher income demand elasticity due to the e¤ect of higher income on relative demands. Fieler (2011) combines non-homothetic preferences and Ricardian comparative advantage in a manycountry model with trade costs, thus generalizing the Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework. 5 Finally, Murata (2008) is a contribution from the New Economic Geography literature that uses non-homothetic preferences in a core-periphery model with trade costs based on Krugman (1991) .
Our contribution relative to the above sets of literature is twofold. First, we show how insights from the international trade and economic geography literature can be applied to the modelling of cross-sectional patterns in levels of industrialization. While this is a relatively straightforward extension of existing results, it nicely complements existing work in the structural change literature, which is mostly based on dynamic frameworks but ignores geographic aspects of industrialization. 6 More speci…cally, our results show that home-market e¤ects are also a powerful factor in explaining the cross-country variation in manufacturing shares, in addition to their impact on 4 Many of these references trace back their ideas to Linder (1961) . As we explain in more detail below, most of the literature consists of highly stylized models that cannot be easily calibrated in a multi-country setting (Fieler (2011) is an exception, again more on this below). 5 See Matsuyama (2000) for a "traditional" Ricardian model with a continuum of goods and non-homothetic preferences. 6 Puga and Venables (1999) and Murata (2008) also use theoretical mechanisms from the new economic geography literature to explain aspects of structural change. However, their focus is, respectively, on the sequential spread of industries across countries, and on jointly accounting for shifts in expenditure and labor allocation from agricultural to non-agricultural goods and the emergence of urban agglomeration. Both papers also use more stylized setups and do not directly connect their models to the data as we do. Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2011) present a spatial endogenous growth model which they use to quantitatively explain structural change in the United States. But they rely on sector-biased productivity growth instead of non-homothetic preferences, and focus on the transition from manufacturing to services (which is less relevant for developing countries).
…ner specialization patterns as documented in, for example, Davis and Weinstein (2003) . Indeed, as we explain below, the explanatory power of our centrality measures for the cross-country variation in manufacturing shares is of comparable magnitude to per-capita income, one of the key explanatory variables in the empirical literature on structural change (e.g., Syrquin and Chenery, 1989) . Likewise, our second stylized fact has important implications for the modelling of comparative advantage forces in open-economy approaches to structural change. While a positive or insigni…cant correlation between comparative advantage in agriculture and manufacturing shares arises naturally from the theoretical mechanisms discussed above, we are not aware of any previous research that documents this correlation empirically for a broad cross-section of developing countries.
Secondly, our paper seems to be the …rst attempt to quantify the importance of trade costs and non-homotheticity in shaping broad sectoral specialization patterns in multi-country settings with trade costs, which is relevant for both sets of literature discussed above. In particular, we show that the e¤ects of trade costs and non-homotheticity highlighted in the existing literature are quantitatively important and of a magnitude su¢ cient to explain some of the key patterns in the data. Put di¤erently, we show that the theoretical mechanisms outlined above are not only relevant in principle, but also under plausibly calibrated parameter values. Building a fully quanti…ed model also allows us to carry out some interesting counterfactual simulations for which the magnitude of parameter values is important and which is an additional contribution of our paper. Among recent quantitative work in international trade and economic geography, Fieler (2011) is the only contribution we are aware of which also introduces non-homothetic preferences into a multi-country setup with trade costs. However, her focus is di¤erent from ours in that she is trying to explain di¤erences in trade patterns and volume across rich and poor countries, and there are also some important di¤erences regarding the theoretical framework and the estimation strategy used in her and our paper. 7 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that the two correlations displayed in Figures 1 and 2 are robust to changes in sample composition and to the inclusion of proxies for local demand and other domestic factors. Section 3 develops a multi-country model with trade costs. Using a number of analytical examples, we use it to provide an explanation for the correlations highlighted in this introduction. In Section 4, we calibrate the model to match international trade and expenditure data and show that this calibrated version generates the same correlations as in Figures 1 and 2 and Section 2. We also conduct a number of counterfactual experiments, which further illustrate the importance of trade costs and non-homotheticity in shaping cross-sectional patterns of industrialization in the developing world. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Evidence
In this section, we examine the robustness of the correlations from the introduction through variations in sample composition and by including a number of control variables. The correlations presented in the following are the ones we will aim at reproducing in our calibration exercise.
Our full econometric speci…cation will be
where RP lt is relative productivity (of agriculture to manufacturing) and CEN lt the 'centrality' of country l, i.e., its access to foreign markets (to be de…ned below). AP lt denotes agricultural productivity, P OP lt the population size of country l, and d t is a full set of year …xed e¤ects.
The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country's share of manufacturing value added in GDP. We use a logistic transformation to account for the fact the manufacturing share is limited to a range between 0 and 1. 8 Concerning the regressors, we discuss the choice of suitable empirical proxies in turn. Additional details on the data and their sources as well as a list of countries used in the regressions below are contained in Appendix A.
Keeping in line with existing studies on Ricardian comparative advantage (e.g., Golub and Hsieh, 2000) , we use labor productivity as a proxy for productivity. In contrast to total factor productivity, this has the advantage of considerably increasing the number of available observations.
We measure labor productivity as value added per worker in agriculture and manufacturing, respectively. Importantly, we use data on sector-speci…c purchasing power parities to strip out the cross-country variation in prices from the relative productivity data, so that the remaining variation more closely re ‡ects physical productivity di¤erences (see Appendix B for additional details) . This ensures the comparability of our empirical exercises (both here and in the quantitative examples below) with our theoretical framework.
We measure country l's centrality (CEN lt ) as the sum of all other countries'GNP, weighted by the inverse of bilateral distances, which are taken to proxy for trade costs between locations:
This speci…cation re ‡ects the basic intuition of our discussion. What matters is centrality in an economic geography sense, that is proximity to markets for domestic products. Of course, the above centrality index is closely related to the concept of market potential …rst proposed by Harris (1954) , which has been frequently used in both geography and -more recently -in economics. A number of studies have demonstrated that this simple proxy has strong explanatory power and yields results very similar to more complex approaches that estimate trade costs from trade ‡ow 8 Using untransformed manufacturing shares instead does not change any of the qualitative results reported below. We have also experimented with including the share of services in GDP as an additional control variable, again without …nding any signi…cant changes in the other coe¢ cient estimates (both sets of results are available from the authors upon request). gravity equations (see, for example, Mayer (2006), or Breinlich (2006) ). 9 As additional control variables, we also include agricultural productiviy (AP ) to account for the pro-industrializing relative-demand e¤ect discussed above, and population size (P OP ) as an additional proxy for the extent of the domestic market. We have data for all the required variables for 112 countries in 2000. Keeping in line with the focus of this paper on the industrialization of developing countries, however, we exclude high-income countries from our regression sample (although of course all available countries are used to calculate the centrality measure). 10 In our robustness checks, we will also brie ‡y present results for the full sample. 11 In Table 1 , we present a number of univariate correlations between the logistic transformation of manufacturing shares and our proxies for comparative advantage (relative productivity, RP ) and centrality. Columns 1-2 replicate the correlations from Figures 1 and 2 and show that using a logistic transformation of manufacturing shares as the dependent variable leads to similar results.
In column 3, we use our more sophisticated measure of centrality (2) . Note that we would now expect to …nd a positive and signi…cant sign, which is indeed what we do. We also note that both measures of centrality seem to be important determinants of levels of industrialization. They explain around 10% of the cross-sectional variation of manufacturing shares in our sample. This is comparable in magnitude to per-capita income, whose positive correlation with manufacturing shares in the initial phase of development is a key variable in much of the existing empirical literature on cross-country patterns of industrialization (e.g., Syrquin and Chenery (1989) ).
In columns 4-8, we undertake a …rst series of robustness checks. One concern with our baseline centrality measure is that a large proportion (approximately 40%) of bilateral trade ‡ows between the countries used in the calculation of CEN l are zero. This raises the question of whether we are simply adding up the GNPs of unrelated foreign countries in (2) . To address this concern, we also present results for a centrality measure which only includes the GNP of a foreign country j in the calculation of our centrality measure for country l if we observe non-zero trade ‡ows between j and l. Column 4 shows that the results for this alternative measure are basically identical to our baseline results. Indeed, the correlation between the two centrality measures in logs is 99%. 12 This seems to be due to the fact that zero trade ‡ows are less common in the data if the trading partner is close by and/or has a high GNP. But these trading partners are also the countries which make the largest contribution to the calculation of our original centrality measure. Put di¤erently, the countries we are dropping now only made small contributions to the original measure and dropping them does not signi…cantly change its value nor the ranking of countries along the centrality measure.
Column 5-6 include a dummy for China and the South-East Asian economies of Korea, Using a nonstructural measure also seems to be better in line with the more explorative character of this section.
1 0 We use the World Bank's income classi…cation and exclude all countries with gross national income per capita in excess of 9,265 USD in 1999 ("high income countries"). 1 is indeed positive and highly signi…cant but the coe¢ cient on our centrality measure remains almost unchanged. The positive correlation between manufacturing shares and relative productivity is increased and becomes statistically signi…cant. In columns 7 and 8, we present results for additional years for which comparable cross-sectional data on relative productivities is available (1980 and 2000, yielding a unbalanced panel of 256 observations in total). Again, using these additional data makes the results from columns 1 and 3 stronger. 13 In Table 2 , we gradually build up our results to the full speci…cation (1) . In column 1 we include population size; column 2 uses agricultural productivity as an additional regressor; and column 3 includes both population and agricultural productivity. 14 In column 4, we drop agricultural productivity and replace it with per-capita GDP. Per-capita GDP helps controlling for the purchasing power of the local population, skill levels, and other potentially confounding factors. Note, however, that it is very highly correlated with agricultural productivity so that in practice both variables are likely to pick up the in ‡uence of similar omitted variables. The high correlation also makes the inclusion of both variables in the same regression impossible. 15 In columns 5-8, we again use our larger sample for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000.
Three main insights arise from these regressions. First, proxies for the size of the domestic market are strongly positively correlated with levels of industrialization, as was to be expected from prior results in the literature. Second, centrality retains its positive and signi…cant in ‡uence throughout. Third, comparative advantage in agriculture has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on industrialization whenever we do not control for absolute agricultural productivity, and an insigni…cant e¤ect whenever we do. This suggests that relative productivity might be picking up the in ‡uence of absolute productivity levels in agriculture.
Limited data availability for relative and absolute agricultural productivity prevents us from estimating speci…cation (1) for a yet larger sample. In columns 9-11, we exclude these variables which increases the sample size more than tenfold since we can now use observations for every year from 1980 to 2005. This allows us to provide some further results on the importance of centrality for industrialization by running variations of the following speci…cation:
where P CGDP lt denotes per-capita GDP and d t and d l are a full set of time and country …xed 1 3 Note that our PPP data do not have su¢ cient country coverage for these earlier years to correct our productivity data for price di¤erences. For example, there are only around 60 countries in the 1985 and 1980 waves of the ICP and, moreover, developing countries are underrepresented in these years. Thus, we use market exchange rates to convert the value added data to a common currency (USD with base year 2000). However, results for the year 2000, for which we can do both PPP and market exchange rate conversions, are qualitatively similar across both approaches. 1 4 As before, we measure agricultural productivity as value added per worker in agriculture, adjusted for crosscountry price variation (see above and Appendix B for details). 1 5 The correlations of the variables in logs is 84% in our sample. 9 e¤ects. Column 9 of Table 2 reports results for an OLS regression pooled over the period with year dummies only. Column 10 estimates the full speci…cation (3) by including country …xed e¤ects, thus eliminating any time-invariant heterogeneity across countries from our correlations.
Column 11 for country-speci…c e¤ects in columns 10 and 11 implies an even stronger role for centrality. 16 
The Model
We now outline a simple multi-country model in which the cross-country variation in manufacturing and agricultural GDP shares is driven by non-homothetic preferences, and absolute and relative sectoral productivities. Because we will allow for positive but …nite trade costs, this model will be able to generate the correlations just presented.
Model Setup and Equilibrium
Consider a world with countries j = 1; :::; R, each with L j consumers, each of which supplies one unit of labor inelastically. There are two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing; we assume perfect labor mobility between sectors, and no international labor mobility. As we discuss in Section 4.2 and Appendix D below, adding a third, non-tradable sector (i.e., services) complicates the analysis but yields similar results, both qualitatively and (in our calibration) quantitatively.
Thus, for the sake of simplicity we abstract from the services sector for most of our analysis.
Preferences are identical across countries. Country-j individuals maximize a Stone-Geary utility function over consumption of an agricultural and a manufacturing composite good:
2 (0; 1), where
Both M j and A j are Armington aggregators of country-speci…c varieties: every country is assumed to produce one di¤erentiated variety. 17 M j is consumption of the manufacturing composite and 1 6 Omitting relative and absolute agricultural productivity does of course lead to an omitted variable bias. To verify the likely magnitude of this bias, we estimated both (1) and (3) on the same samples used in columns 1-4 and 5-8. Comparing the coe¢ cient on CEN in these regressions does indeed suggest that omitting AP and RP leads to an upward bias, albeit a small one. 1 7 The Armington assumption ensures that all countries consume all varieties provided trade costs and elasticities m lj is the amount of the variety produced in l that is consumed by an individual consumer in j.
Similarly, A j is consumption of the agricultural composite and a lj is the amount of the variety produced in l that is consumed by an individual consumer in j. The elasticities of substitution between varieties are constant at M ; A > 1.
Ā > 0 denotes minimal consumption of agricultural goods, i.e., the subsistence level. These preferences guarantee that above the level Ā the expenditure share of agricultural goods declines with rising per-capita income. This is the so-called Engel's law, which has strong empirical foundations (see, for example, Crafts (1980) ). We assume Ā < Al for all l, where Al is agricultural productivity in country l (to be de…ned below). This assumption guarantees that per-capita income in each country is su¢ cient to reach the subsistence level. Thus, at least some expenditure will be devoted to manufacturing products.
Below we impose enough structure so that labor is the only source of income. The individual's budget constraint in country j is therefore given by P M j M j + P Aj A j = w j , with w j denoting the wage in j, equal across sectors. P M j and P Aj are price indices for the manufacturing and agricultural composite goods. Prices paid for the di¤erent products in the importing location j, p M lj and p Alj , consist of the mill price charged in country l plus industry-speci…c bilateral trade
These trade costs are of the iceberg-type form: for every unit of a good that is shipped from l to j, only 1=T lj arrive while the rest "melts"en route.
By assumption, each country produces a di¤erentiated variety of the manufacturing and the agricultural good. We also assume that …rms operate under constant returns to scale, and use labor as the only input. Since goods are just di¤erentiated by origin and there are constant returns to scale, we can safely assume many …rms in each sector-country so that industries are perfectly competitive. The amount of labor employed in manufacturing in country l is denoted by L M l , and supply of the local variety is m l = M l L M l , where M l denotes productivity in manufacturing in country l. The amount of labor employed in agriculture in country l is denoted by L Al , and supply of the local variety is a l = Al L Al . Productivity levels are allowed to vary across countries and sectors. Positive production implies f.o.b. prices equal the cost of producing one unit of output:
Equilibrium in the manufacturing and agricultural goods markets requires that demand for each Armington variety equals its supply. With goods markets clearing, we can express labor demand as a function of the vector of wages of all countries. Full employment requires L M l +L Al = L l ., which can be rewritten as of substitution are …nite. This implies that all countries have diversi…ed production structures in equilibrium, which is the empirically relevant case and makes the calibration of the model signi…cantly easier. It has the drawback, however, that it rules out zero trade ‡ows between country pairs, which is not true in the data. Trade theory addresses this issue by assuming demand systems that yield …nite reservation prices, such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Behrens, Mion, Murata and Südekum (2009) . Calibrating such models for our sample of countries represents an important challenge due to data availability issues. Since bilateral trade ‡ows are not our main object of study in this paper, we leave this problem for future research.
These are R non-linear equations in the R wage rates, determining the vector of wages and subsequently all other equilibrium variables of the model. For the analysis below, we also de…ne the share of manufacturing in GDP, which in the following is also referred to as the level of industrialization of a location:
Analysis
Before proceeding to the quanti…cation of the model just outlined, we brie ‡y discuss a number of analytical results which help to build intuition for the full-scale multi-country calibration which follows in the next section. We start by discussing the two polar cases of in…nite and zero trade costs ("closed economy" and "free trade"), and then move on to the general case with positive trade costs.
Closed Economy
With in…nitely high levels of trade costs, i.e., under autarky, it is easy to show that the expression for the share of manufacturing in GDP simpli…es to
As is apparent from equation (M S AU T ), the manufacturing share in GDP increases with agricultural productivity. Non-homothetic preferences (due to the positive subsistence consumption level in agriculture, Ā > 0) are crucial for this result. Intuitively, the increases in per-capita income resulting from higher values of Al lead to a decline in the share of subsistence consumption in total expenditure. As every unit of income above the subsistence level is spent in …xed proportions on agricultural and manufacturing varieties, the expenditure share of the latter rises. In a closed economy, this leads in turn to a shift of labor into manufacturing and an increase in ShareM l .
As discussed, we refer to this positive impact of agricultural productivity on industrialization as the "relative-demand e¤ect"of agricultural productivity shocks. Very similar e¤ects are obtained in the existing literature on structural change in closed economies (e.g., Matsuyama (1992) or Murphy et al. (1989b) ). Note that the autarky assumption renders any cross-country di¤erences in centrality or comparative advantage completely irrelevant.
Free Trade
Under free trade, Ricardian comparative advantage emerges as the key factor for the determination of the level of industrialization. With costless trade, and assuming
Since
lower ratios M l = Al imply a stronger bias towards agriculture in the production structures of countries. As in standard Ricardian models of international trade, being relatively productive in agriculture biases a country's production structure towards agriculture, thus reducing the share of manufacturing in GDP as the location specializes accordingly. We will refer to this as the "comparative advantage e¤ect". Notice that free trade eliminates any independent in ‡uence of the productivity level Al on industrialization via the non-homothetic preferences channel we discussed above.
Costly Trade
With positive but …nite trade costs, a number of new e¤ects arise in our model. We brie ‡y discuss the underlying intuition here, and refer the reader to Appendix C for a number of analytical examples that illustrate these e¤ects for simpli…ed versions of the full model we will use in the calibration.
The …rst set of results we outline will help us understand why developing countries that are closer to major markets will have a higher manufacturing share in GDP. It is a long-standing theoretical result in international trade theory that the size of the home market matters for industrial structure (Krugman (1980) , Krugman and Helpman (1985) ). In a world with positive trade costs, central locations have e¤ectively a larger market size as they are closer to sources of demand, ceteris paribus. Note that it does not follow immediately that such countries will specialize in manufacturing because more central locations will also experience higher demand for both agricultural and manufacturing goods relative to less central locations. Several mechanisms have been proposed in the literature for how specialization will nevertheless obtain. Two are of particular relevance here.
First, being more central raises demand for both agricultural and manufacturing goods and raises wages. 18 With non-homothetic preferences, this leads to an expansion of domestic manufacturing expenditure. If there are positive trade costs, this will translate into a domestic manufacturing share higher than in other countries, as the resulting increase in manufacturing expenditure will have a stronger e¤ect on the domestic manufacturing good than on those produced by other countries (see Murata (2008) for a similar mechanism). Example 1 in Appendix C 1 8 See Redding and Venables (2004) for empirical evidence on the positive e¤ect of centrality on income levels.
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illustrates this mechanism for a simpli…ed version of our model with three countries (the minimum necessary to explain the role of centrality).
A second reason why centrality favors industrialization is based on di¤erent elasticities of substitution of manufacturing and agricultural products (see Hanson and Xiang, 2004 ). Higher wages due to a more central position lead to higher prices of both types of goods. If agricultural goods are more homogeneous than manufacturing goods (this would correspond to A > M in our model), central locations will specialize in manufacturing, ceteris paribus. This is since demand for locally produced manufacturing varieties will be less sensitive to higher prices than demand for the country's agricultural variety. Example 2 in Appendix C illustrates this mechanism, again using a simpli…ed version of our full model.
Trade costs can also a¤ect the response of specialization patterns to changes in productivity (also compare Murata (2008)). An increase in agricultural productivity, for example, will generate a "relative-demand e¤ect" in favor of the manufacturing industry through the non-homothetic preferences, and a "comparative-advantage e¤ect"in favor of agriculture. 
Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate a multi-country version of our model using data on 107 developed and developing countries. We choose parameter values to match data on international trade ‡ows, expenditure, productivity levels and population size (Section 4.1). We use this calibrated model to generate data on manufacturing shares and the independent variables used in the regressions in Tables 1 and 2 , and show that the generated data display the same correlations between centrality, comparative advantage and manufacturing shares found in the actual data (Section 4.2). In Section 4.3, we compare our baseline calibration to three alternative parameterizations of our model -one with in…nite trade costs ('autarky'), one with zero trade costs ('free trade') and one without homothetic preferences. We show that all three of these alternatives fail to reproduce our stylized facts and also perform worse in matching actual data on manufacturing shares. In a …nal step (Section 4.4), we use the original parameterization of our the model to shed light on two ongoing debates in the literature -the impact of higher agricultural productivity on manufacturing activity and the e¤ects of a global vs. regional reduction in trade barriers.
Parameterization
For a calibrated version of our model, we need data on the size of countries'workforces (L l ) and productivity levels ( Al , M l ), and values for the parameters governing substitution elasticities
, the manufacturing expenditure share ( ), and subsistence consumption (Ā ). Table 3 provides parameter estimates and a brief description of the calibration procedure and data sources used. In the following, we describe the calibration in more detail.
Data requirements limit the sample to 107 countries for the year 2000, 79 of which are classi…ed as developing and will be used in our regression analysis of the simulated data. 19 We follow Feenstra (1994) in using variation in import quantities and prices to identify elasticities of substitution among manufacturing and agricultural varieties ( A , M ). This approach, as extended by and , has become the dominant method for estimating substitution elasticities in the international trade literature in recent years.
In our setting, it has the additional advantage of building on a very similar demand structure as our paper (CES and Armington varieties), while allowing for more general supply side features.
We adapt this approach to our setting by using data that correspond to our calibration exercise in terms of country coverage, time period and the de…nition of sectors for which we estimate elasticities. We focus on a discussion of our estimates in the following and refer the reader to Appendix E for a more detailed description of the Feenstra-Broda-Weinstein methodology and how we adapt it to our setting.
For our baseline elasticity estimates, we use cross-country trade data for the year 2000, but restrict the estimation sample to the 102 countries in our calibration sample, for which we have the necessary information on import prices and quantities. 20 We obtain M = 2:3 and A = 2:3. imposing a common elasticity as we do in accordance with our model). The median across these estimates for the 60 countries also present in our data is 3.4. Given the much higher degree of aggregation in our data (two instead of 200 sectors), our lower estimates seem plausible. This is because both economic theory and the empirical results of and suggest that estimated elasticities should fall as the level of aggregation increases and varieties become less similar. 21 As a robustness check, we also obtain estimates using data on imports by the U.S. from the countries in our calibration sample. 22 These data are likely to be of higher quality than the crosscountry data used before (see Feenstra, Romalis and Schott, 2002) , although of course we only have one importer now instead of 102. Using these data yields comparable coe¢ cient magnitudes as before although agricultural varities are now estimated to be slightly more substitutable across 1 9 See Appendix A for a list of countries included in the calibration sample. All 107 countries will be used to generate our synthetic data set as developed countries do of course play a major role in determining manufacturing shares and centrality of developing countries.
2 0 Three groups of countries only report one common set of trade data, explaining the …ve missing observations: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa; Belgium and Luxembourg; and St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 2 2 Again, we lose …ve countries due to aggregation in the trade data (see footnote 21), leaving us with 101 exporters (the U.S. is of course excluded as an exporter). countries ( M = 2:0 and A = 2:6).
Since labor is the only factor of production in our model, we proxy M l and Al by labor productivity in manufacturing and agriculture, respectively. However, as already discussed in Section 2, the variation in measured labor productivity across countries and sectors that we observe in the data is driven by both di¤erences in technological e¢ ciency and di¤erences in prices.
That is, lp :l = V A :l =L :l = p :l x :l =L :l in terms of our model because we abstract from intermediate inputs. Since we are only interested in :l = x :l =L :l , we use data on purchasing power parities for agriculture and manufacturing goods consumption from the International Comparison Program (ICP) to construct proxies for p :l and strip out price variation from the data (see Appendix B for details). 23 Estimates of the trade cost matrices can be obtained via gravity equation regressions using cross-country manufacturing and agricultural trade data. To see this, note that exports in the model are:
The only bilateral variable on the right-hand side in the above expressions is trade cost T lj . We proxy for these costs by T lj = dist 1 lj e 2 d int;lj , where dist lj denotes the bilateral distance between countries l and j, and 1 denotes the elasticity of trade cost with respect to distance. The dummy variable d int;lj indicates if a trade ‡ow crosses national borders (i.e., d int;lj = 1 if l 6 = j and 0 if l = j). This is a parameterisation of trade cost which is common in the international trade literature (e.g., Wei (1996) ). Proxying all other variables by importer and exporter …xed e¤ects and adding an error term, we can rewrite bilateral exports as
We estimate (10) in its original multiplicative form via Poisson QMLE, using data from the sources listed in Table 3 and following Wei (1996) in proxying internal trade ‡ows as domestic production (gross output) minus exports. 24 As has been pointed out by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Poisson QMLE can accomodate zero trade ‡ows, which are common in our data, and leads to consistent parameter estimates even in the presence of heteroskedasticity in " lj . Appendix Table   A .1 contains details of the estimation results, which are broadly in line with those from comparable speci…cations in the literature. 25 In robustness checks below, we will also use estimates of T lj obtained by estimating a log-linearized version of (10) via OLS (see Appendix Table A.1 for results). The distance coe¢ cients in both sets of estimations provide estimates for (1 ) which, together with our estimated values of , yield estimates for and thus for T lj = dist 1 lj e 2 d int;lj . We again use data on nominal and real expenditure on food and manufacturing goods from the ICP to obtain values for and Ā . In the model, the nominal expenditure share of manufacturing in GDP, and real consumption of agricultural goods per head, respectively, are given by:
Note that as w j ! 1, S EM j ! ; and as w j !Ā P Aj , E Aj = (P Aj L j ) !Ā . For our simulations below, we thus use the nominal expenditure share of manufacturing in total expenditure on food and manufacturing (S EM j = (S EM j + S EAj )) of the richest country (Luxembourg) in our data as a proxy for . Likewise, we use the real food expenditure per worker of the poorest country (Zambia) as a proxy for Ā . 26 
Replication of Stylized Facts
We now present results for the same regressions as in Tables 1 and 2 , but this time we use simulated rather than actual data for the year 2000. 27 That is, we use the calibrated model to generate arti…cial data on manufacturing shares for the developing countries in our simulation sample. 28 Note that our model also generates data for per-capita GDP (equal to wages in the model), GDP (wages times population size) and centrality (calculated according to (2) , using the same distance data but replacing GNP with model-generated GDP). Thus, we use generated data for both dependent and independent variables in the regressions below, consistent with the notion that we would like to evaluate whether our model is comparable to the data generating available only leads to minor changes in the estimates for the trade cost elasticities which have no impact on the following results (details available from the authors). 2 5 In a recent meta study, Disdier and Head (2008) report that the mean distance elasticitiy of the 1,467 estimates they analyze is -0.9, very close to our Poisson estimates. Most studies exclude intranational trade but those that include it …nd estimates of comparable magnitude to ours. For example, Wei (1996) estimates (1 M ) M 2 = 2:27 for a sample of OECD countries between 1982 and 1994, compared to (1 M ) M 2 = 1:99 in our estimation. 2 6 Again, also see Appendix B for further details on the ICP data. We have also experimented with using averages across the three or …ve richest/poorest countries, with similar results in the quantitative examples below. A signi…cant downside of using more countries is, however, that the resulting higher estimates of Ā implied that we needed to drop countries from the data for which the subsistence condition of the model (Ā < Al ) was violated.
process in the real world. Population size and productivity data are of course directly used as model parameters, and are identical to the data used in the regressions from Section 2. Table 4 presents regression results using our generated data which yield a similar picture as our earlier results using actual data. 29 The coe¢ cient on centrality is positive and signi…cant in all speci…cations. Likewise, relative productivity is never signi…cantly negative. Similar to Table   2 , it has a positive impact on industrialization in columns 1 and 5, but loses its signi…cance as soon as we control for agricultural productivity. Thus, we replicate the basic …ndings highlighted in the introduction and in Section 2. Tables 5 and 6 report a number of robustness checks. We …rst demonstrate that augmenting the model by a third, non-tradable sector (which can be thought of as services) does not change our previous results. We now model the representative individual's preferences from country j as
where A j and M j are de…ned as before, and S j = s j is the locally produced services good. 30 Similar to agricultural and manufacturing varieties, services are produced using only labor with linear production technology s l = Sl L Sl (where Sl is labor productivity in services in country l). In Appendix D, we provide a more detailed exposition of the model, the resulting equilibrium conditions and analytical examples comparable to Section 4. As we show there, allowing for a service sector in the model complicates the analysis somewhat but the qualitative results go through as before.
Regarding the calibration of this augmented model, note that since the third sector is nontradable and non-di¤erentiated, we only require new estimates for , Ā , , and M (see Appendix D for the modi…ed procedure for obtaining them). In Table 5 , we present the same set of regressions results as in Table 4 , this time using the calibrated version of the three-sector model to generate our synthetic dataset. The results are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to before.
We conclude that allowing for an additional non-tradable sector does not change our previous conclusions and we work with the initial two-sector model for the rest of this paper. 31 2 9 Note that the set of countries is the slightly di¤erent in Tables 1, 2 and 4 because of di¤erent data requirements. For generating our arti…cial data, we require the same independent variables as in Tables 1 and 2 , but also employment in agriculture and manufacturing to compute workforce sizes (Lj). On the other hand, we do not need data on manufacturing shares as before. Running regressions on actual and generated data for the 76 countries present in both samples yields very similar results to Tables 1, 2 and 4 (available from the authors).
3 0 We also worked with an alternative speci…cation of preferences as in Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) , where Uj = ln(Mj) + ln(Aj Ā ) + (1 ) ln (Sj + S ). As long as Ā > M in our original preference speci…cation (which is the case empirically, see Table 3 ) this new speci…cation leads to identical qualitative results. Quantitative results from the calibrated model are also very similar to before although the calibration of preference parameters is slightly more involved in this new case (results available from the authors). 3 1 The three-sector model also allows for an interesting extension of our data and results. Since we are now modelling the services sector as well, our model should be better suited to model the sectoral structure of developed countries as well. According to our model, comparative advantage and centrality should also play a role in determining manufacturing shares for this group of countries (although the impact of non-homotheticity will be smaller at higher income levels). In Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3, we thus present results for the full set of countries for which we have data (both developing and developed). Table A.2 uses actual data, while Table A.3 uses the data just generated by our three sector model. Again, both sets of results are similar, con…rming that the model also performs well when applied to all countries.
In Table 6 , we report a number of additional robustness checks for the two-sector model.
The …rst three columns use our alternative set of substitution elasticity estimates ( M = 2:0 and A = 2:6). In columns 4-6, we use ordinary least squares to estimate equation (10) , leading to alternative estimates for 1M , 1A , 2M , and 2A . Finally, in columns 7-9 we use producer prices rather than consumer prices to de ‡ate relative productivities (see Appendix B). As shown, none of these changes alters the basic message from Table 4 . Centrality is positive and significant throughout. Relative productivity is positive and signi…cant when we do not control for agriculture productivity, and it is always insigni…cant when we do. 32 
Model Evaluation and Comparison
In Table 7 we compare our baseline calibration with subsistence consumption and positive but …nite trade costs (see Tables 3 and 4 ) to three alternative calibrations. In the …rst, we set the trade cost parameters ( 1M , 1A , 2M , and 2A ) to in…nity ('autarky'). In the second, we set the same parameters to zero ('free trade'), and in the third, we use our original trade cost estimates but eliminate non-homotheticity by setting Ā = 0.
Our comparison uses two criteria. First, can the model qualitatively replicate the correlations found in the data between comparative advantage and centrality, on the one hand, and manufacturing shares, on the other hand? Second, how well do the original and the three alternative parameterizations do in terms of replicating actual manufacturing shares? To evaluate this second criterion, we regress actual on simulated manufacturing shares, and look at the sign and signi…cance of the corresponding intercept and slope coe¢ cient, as well as at the R 2 of the regression. With a perfect …t between actual and simulated data, we would expect an intercept equal to zero, and a slope coe¢ cient and R 2 of unity. Note that in this simple regression, the R 2 is also equal to the squared correlation coe¢ cient between actual and generated data which we also report for convenience.
In columns 1-3 of Table 7 , we restate our baseline results from Table 4 and report the measures of …t described above. Our baseline parameterization not only reproduces our stylized facts but also produces a moderately good …t to the data (see the last lines of the table). The intercept of the regression of actual on simulated manufacturing shares is zero, the slope coe¢ cient is 0.8 and statistically indistinguishable from unity, and the correlation between actual and generated data is around +40%.
How does this compare to our three alternative parameterizations? Looking at free trade …rst, we see that the model's performance in this case is dismal with respect to all criteria (columns 4-6). As expected, the coe¢ cient on comparative advantage is negative and strongly signi…cant, whereas the one on centrality is negative in column 5 and turns insigni…cant once we include all regressors in column 6. The intercept from the regression of actual on simulated manufacturing shares is positive and signi…cant, the slope coe¢ cient close to zero and statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from one, and the corresponding R 2 close to zero. The model's performance with in…nitely high trade costs is somewhat better, in the sense that it can replicate the facts related to relative productivity (column 7-9). However, the coe¢ cient on centrality is insigni…cant throughout as expected. 33 Also, while the …t of the model to the data is much better under autarky than with free trade, it is outperformed by our baseline calibration on all our criteria (R 2 , closeness of the regression intercept to zero and of the slope to unity). Finally, the performance of our model deteriorates substantially when we eliminate subsistence consumption. As expected, the model is no longer able to replicate our stylized facts and and the regression R 2 drops to just 0.04. 34 
Counterfactuals Experiments
Having demonstrated the empirical relevance of our calibrated model, we use it to perform a number of counterfactual simulations.
In the …rst counterfactual, we analyze the role of one of the key drivers of industrialization in existing models of structural change (agriculture productivity) in our setting with positive but …nite trade cost. We start from the baseline calibration of our model and gradually increase agricultural productivity. We do so separately for each country and record the associated change in the manufacturing share in that country. We then compare the direction and magnitude of these changes across more and less remote developing countries, as measured by our centrality measure in (2) . Figure 3 plots the increase in agricultural productivity on the horizontal axis, and the resulting average change in the manufacturing share for three groups of countries on the vertical axis: developing countries in the lowest tercile of our centrality measure, developing countries in the middle tercile and developing countries in the top tercile. 35 As seen, the less central an economy is, the more its manufacturing share increases following a given increase in agricultural productivity. 36 Interestingly, higher agricultural productivity on average raises manufacturing shares across all terciles of the centrality measure, with only a small minority of 3 3 The fact that the coe¢ cient on centrality is not exactly zero under autarky is of course due to functional form misspeci…cation, given that the true data generating process in the model is more complicated than the simple log-linear relationship postulated in our regression tables throughout. For future research, it would be interesting to investigate whether using functional forms directly implied by the model have higher explanatory power in the actual data as well. We note, however, that this does not invalidate our earlier comparisons based on log-linear speci…cations as the issue of functional form misspeci…cation applies to both actual and generated data. If the underlying data generating process were similar in both samples, we would expect the same log-linear approximation to yield similar results (as indeed it does). 3 4 We have also experimented with using lower but non-zero levels of subsistence consumption. As expected, the univariate correlation between relative productivity and manufacturing shares gradually declines as we lower Ā but it only becomes insign…cant at below 10% of its original value. Likewise, the comparative advantage term in the speci…cation controlling for agricultural productivity becomes negative and signi…cant at values of around 25% of the original value. 3 5 Figure 3 also plots 95% con…dence intervals for the mean of each group, indicating that the means of the top and bottom tercile are statistically di¤erent from each other (we omit the con…dence interval for the middle tercile to avoid clutter but note that it overlaps with the con…dence intervals of the other terciles). 3 6 Note that the e¤ect of agricultural productivity increases does also depend on a country's initial per-capita income (pro-industrializing e¤ects are smaller for richer countries). Thus, we also ran multivariate regressions of our simulated changes in manufacturing shares on centrality, controlling for wages (or, alternatively, for initial agricultural and manufacturing productivity) as well as population size. Centrality continued to have a positive and signi…cant impact on simulated share changes. 20 countries experiencing a (very slight) decline. Put di¤erently, what we called the "relative-demand e¤ect"of agricultural productivity shocks outweighs their "comparative-advantage e¤ect"for our baseline parameter estimates. While our model is of course highly stylized, this suggests that the de-industrialising e¤ects of high agricultural productivity highlighted in parts of the literature (e.g., Matsuyama (1992 Matsuyama ( , 2009 )) might not be relevant in practice.
Our …rst experiment holds trade costs constant while changing the comparative advantage of countries. Our second and third experiments do the opposite. We gradually increase openness to trade in our model and observe how existing comparative advantage patterns manifest themselves.
We do so by gradually eliminating the home bias component of our trade cost matrix, again starting from the baseline calibration of our model (i.e., we gradually lower 2M and 2A and recompute the trade cost matrix T ). The home bias parameters can be thought of as a summary measure of all trade barriers which render international trade more costly relative to intranational trade. As such, it is the closest equivalent in our model to policy-induced changes such a regional trade agreements and multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO which try to eliminate both tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers to trade. 37 In our second experiment, we reduce trade barriers between all countries (i.e., we use the lower values for 2M and 2A for all elements of our trade cost matrix). In our third experiment, we only reduce trade costs between countries in the same geographic region, using the World Bank's classi…cation of countries into seven broad regions. 38 Figure 4 shows results for the global reduction in trade barriers. We again plot the resulting changes in manufacturing shares for three groups of countries, but this time group countries into terciles according to their comparative advantage in agriculture (as measured by the parameter ratio Al = M l ). As expected, countries increasingly specialize according to their comparative advantage as the degree of openness increases. 39 We also note that the average impact of trade liberalization on manufacturing activity is positive and that the majority of developing countries see an increase in manufacturing shares. This e¤ect arises because freer trade increases real income levels and thus shifts expenditure towards manufacturing. Figure 5 shows the results for a regional reduction in trade barriers. The picture looks broadly similar to before, but with two important exceptions. First, the average increase in manufacturing shares is smaller. This is simply due to the fact that the impact of regional trade liberalization on real wages is lower than that of the full liberalization, and the average increase in manufacturing expenditure thus smaller. Secondly, the induced specialization is more muted than in the case of a global reduction in trade barriers. Note that this is not due to the fact that some trade barriers still remain in this case. 40 Rather, it is because di¤erences in comparative advantage (as measured by the productivity ratio Al = M l ) are less pronounced across neighbouring countries.
At least for the case of free trade, the underlying intuition is easily seen from the analytical results in Section 3.2.2. What matters for the variation in manufacturing shares across countries in our model is the variation in relative productivity levels -and this variation is smaller within than across regions. For example, the standard deviation of our comparative advantage measures across developing countries is 0.36 globally but only 0.23 on average if we look region by region.
Across all 107 developed and developing countries used in our calibration, it is 0.34 globally but only 0.20 regionally. More generally, bilateral di¤erences in comparative advantage seem to increase signi…cantly with bilateral distance, at least in our data. 41 Again, while our model is highly stylized, we think that this di¤erential impact of global and regional reductions in trade barriers on industrialization adds an interesting element to the ongoing discussion on the relative merits of regional trade agreements vs multilateral liberalization in the WTO.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have drawn attention to two cross-sectional facts which, taken together, are not easily explained by existing models of industrialization. Drawing on a number of theoretical mechanisms well-known in the trade and economic geography literature, we presented a multilocation model with trade costs and non-homothetic preferences. Using analytical examples and a full-scale many-country calibration, we showed that this model can account for our stylized facts.
Introducing trade cost and non-homotheticity also improved the …t of the model to cross-sectional data on manufacturing shares as compared to models with zero or in…nite trade costs, or without non-homotheticity. Finally, the parameterized version of our model lends itself to counterfactual analysis which we illustrated through examples regarding agricultural productivity growth and a global vs regional reduction in trade barriers.
4 0 For example, we also conducted counterfactual experiments in which we only reduced trade barriers between developed and developing countries, or among developing countries only. We found that in some scenarios, the average decline in manufacturing shares for the group of developing countries with the highest relative productivity in agriculture was actually more pronounced than in the case of a global reduction in trade barriers. 4 1 To show this, we ran regressions of the form pr lj = a + ldist lj + e lj , where a is an intercept, ldist lj is the log of the bilateral distance between l and j and where pr lj = 1=relpr lj if relpr lj < 1 and relpr lj otherwise (relpr ljt = ( Al = M l )=( Aj = M j )); this de…nition of pr lj assures that it takes on a value of unity for countries with identical relative productivities and is larger otherwise). A simple OLS regression yielded a coe¢ cient on ldist lj of around 0.3 which was signi…cant at the 1%-level. This result is robust to the inclusion of dummies for reporter and/or partner countries. 
B Appendix B: Using ICP Data to Proxy for Prices
In Sections 2 and 4 we use data from the International Comparison Project (ICP) to strip out price variation from measured productivity. To understand this approach, note that the ICP provides data on a number of expenditure categories in both current U.S. dollars and so-called international dollars ($I). One $I is the amount of goods and services one U.S. dollar would purchase in the USA in the base period (2005 in our case as no data were available for 2000). Converting expenditure from current U.S. dollars into $I thus removes any price di¤erences across countries and basically converts expenditures into quantities using implicit aggregators. By comparing local expenditures in U.S. dollars and international dollars, one can derive country-product-speci…c PPP exchange rates which capture price di¤erences across country. For example, per-capita expenditure on food in current U.S. dollars was $2,040 in 2005 in the United Kingdom but only 1,586 $I, yielding an implicit price of 1.29 (the price in the USA is normalized to 1). Dividing measured productivity levels (p M l m l =L M l and p Al a l =L Al ) by this price converts them into quantities per unit of labor used and thus into appropriate proxies for M l = m l =L M l and Al = a l =L Al . We note that Echevarria (1997) uses a similar procedure, calculating proxies for agricultural and manufacturing prices by dividing expenditures in U.S. dollars by expenditures in international dollars.
One problem with the above approach is that we are implicitly using consumer prices rather than producer prices to de ‡ate production. In terms of our model, ICP prices are proxies for P M l and P Al , not p M l and p Al . As a robustness check in Section 4, we therefore use the de…nition of P M l and P Al to extract information on p M l and p Al in a model-consistent way. In our model,
Together with data on the elasticities of substitution and trade costs which we have obtained independently as part of our calibration strategy, we can solve the above system of equations for p M l and p Al . In practice, consumer and implied producer prices are almost identical, with a correlation coe¢ cient of above 99% and a level di¤erence of on average less than 4% for manufacturing and less than 1% for agriculture.
C Appendix C: Analytical Examples
This appendix provides the analytical treatment of the examples discussed in Section 3.2.3.
Example 1 Consider a three-country world, R = 3, and a geographic structure such that country 1 takes a "central"position while countries 2 and 3, which are fully symmetric, are in the "periphery": we model this by assuming that country 1 can trade with both 2 and 3 at positive but …nite trade costs (T 12 = T 21 = T 13 = T 31 = T > 1) and that countries 2 and 3 cannot trade with one another (T 23 = T 32 = 1). 42 Trade costs are assumed equal across sectors. We simplify further by assuming M = A = . Finally, we choose all parameters to be identical across countries (except for the bilateral trade costs) and, in particular, we set Aj = M j = L j = 1. Pro…ting from the symmetry we have imposed, let us normalize w 2 = w 3 = 1.
It is easy to show that we cannot have an equilibrium in which w 1 = 1, as the model's market clearing conditions would be violated. We can prove this by contradiction. If it were the case that w 1 = w 2 = w 3 = 1, then aggregate labor demand would be di¤erent across countries:
Thus, it must be the case that w 1 > w 2 = w 3 . Due to the non-homotheticity of preferences, this implies that country 1's expenditure is biased towards manufacturing: E M 1 > E M 2 . As discussed above, positive trade costs lead this bias in demand for manufacturing goods to favor country 1's manufacturing industry primarily:
Establishing analytical results here is di¢ cult, but the condition 2 > T 1 , for example, is su¢ cient for L M 1 > L M 2 , which implies a larger manufacturing share in the central country.
Example 2 Again assume R = 3 and that all parameters are identical across countries (except for the bilateral trade costs) and, in particular, that Aj = M j = L j = 1, A = 1, and M > 1 but …nite. Again, we consider a geographic structure such that country 1 takes a "central"position while countries 2 and 3 are in the "periphery": here we model this by assuming that country 1 can trade freely with both 2 and 3 (T 12 = T 21 = T 13 = T 31 = 1) and that countries 2 and 3 cannot trade with one another (T 23 = T 32 = 1). 43 Trade costs are again equal across sectors. We take the agricultural good as the numéraire. Under incomplete specialization for all countries, the labor market equilibrium conditions comprise equations
It is easy to show that in this case country 1's manufacturing share is larger than that of countries 2 and
If parameter values in this incomplete specialization scenario yielded L M 1 > 1, then country 1 would specialize completely in manufacturing. 44 In this case, the labor market equilibrium conditions comprise equations
which imply w 1 > w 2 = w 3 = 1. Notice that the mechanism discussed in this example does not depend on the non-homotheticity of preferences: assuming Ā = 0 would not change the result here. 45 Example 3 Consider many countries (R large). For simplicity, we assume again M = A = . All country-pairs face the same bilateral trade costs: T M jl = T A jl = T > 1 for all j 6 = l. All countries have the same population size and productivities, Aj = M j = L j = 1 for all j, except for A1 > 1. By symmetry, we can normalize w j = 1 for all j 6 = l. From the model's equilibrium conditions,
for countries 1 and j. Assuming that trade costs are such that countries consume sizable amounts of foreign goods, one can neglect the e¤ect of A1 on the price levels P M l and P Al . A high A1 therefore has a direct e¤ect in the denominator of equation (22) and an indirect e¤ect via a high w 1 in the terms E M 1 and E A1 of both equations. Notice …rst that the direct e¤ect of A1 raises country 1's agricultural share in GDP (the comparative-advantage e¤ect). Second, a higher w 1 (due to a higher A1 ) tilts relative expenditure towards manufacturing in both country 1 and country j because of the non-homotheticity in demand, but more so in country 1 due to the presence of trade costs. As discussed above, this relative-demand e¤ect operates in the direction opposite to the comparative-advantage e¤ect.
D Appendix D: A Three-Sector Model
This appendix works out the three-sector model of Section 4.2, where the third sector, services, is assumed to be nontraded. We allow for non-homotheticities in demand to a¤ect the manufacturing sector, too, as this is has been considered in the literature relatively often (see, for example, Matsuyama (2009)).
D.1 Demand Side
The individual's preferences are now
with
where ; ;
As we discuss below, total income equals labor income, as pro…ts are zero. The price indices in the budget constraint are
where
Implicit here is the assumption that sector S is non-traded. Aggregating across all individuals/countries yields the following demands for varieties (net of trade costs):
D.2 Production
Goods are produced with linear technologies:
Perfect competition implies
D.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the goods markets yields
Labor demand:
Full employment requires
31
These are R non-linear equations in the R wage rates.
D.4 Autarky
It is easy to show that
D.5 Free Trade
With costless trade, and assuming A = M = , it is easy to show that
The relative share of the services sector depends positively on the country's wage (as long as the e¤ect of w l on P Al and P M l is assumed negligible):
D.6 Costly Trade
Example 1 with three sectors Consider a three-country world, R = 3, and a geographic structure such that country 1 takes a "central" position while countries 2 and 3, which are fully symmetric, are in the "periphery": we model this by assuming that country 1 can trade with both 2 and 3 at positive but …nite trade costs (T 12 = T 21 = T 13 = T 31 = T > 1) and that countries 2 and 3 cannot trade with one another (T 23 = T 32 = 1). Trade costs are assumed equal across industries. We simplify further by assuming M = A = . Finally, assume all parameters are identical across countries (except for the bilateral trade costs) and, in particular, that Aj = M j = Sj = L j = 1 and M = 0. Pro…ting from the symmetry we have imposed, let us normalize w 2 = w 3 = 1.
The results discussed in example 1 above apply here as well.
Example 2 with three sectors Assume all parameters are identical across countries (except for the bilateral trade costs) and, in particular, that Aj = M j = Sj = L j = 1, A = 1, and M > 1 but …nite. We simplify further by assuming Ā =M = 0. Again, we consider a geographic structure such that country 1 takes a "central" position while countries 2 and 3 are in the "periphery": here we model this by assuming that country 1 can trade freely with both 2 and 3 (T 12 = T 21 = T 13 = T 31 = 1) and that countries 2 and 3 cannot trade with one another (T 23 = T 32 = 1). Trade costs are equal across sectors here. We take the agricultural good as the numéraire.
The results discussed in example 2 above apply here as well with small variations. First, it is easy to show that L Sj = 1 for all countries. Second, it is easy to show as well that 
D.7 Calibration
Since the third sector is non-tradable and non-di¤erentiated, we do not require new estimates for
, and 2A (note that the expression for manufacturing and agricultural exports in the model is the same as in the two sector version). However, we do require new estimates for , Ā , , and M since and M are new parameters and the meaning of and Ā has changed due to the introduction of the third sector.
To obtain estimates of these new parameters, we follow our earlier approach to use expenditure shares and food consumption for the richest and poorest country in our data, respectively. To see this, note that expenditure shares in the new model are given by:
As w j ! 1, S EM j ! , S EAj ! and S ESj ! (1 ). Thus, a suitable proxy for and are the expenditure shares of the richest country in the data.
Likewise, note that as w j ! (Ā P Aj + M P M j ), consumption per head convergence to the agricultural and manufacturing subsistence levels:
Since w j =Ā P Aj +M P M j is the income level which guarantees that the substistence level is just attainable, a suitable proxy for Ā and M are real expenditure per worker in the poorest country in our data (measured in $I). 46 M gt is the subutility derived from the consumption of imported good g at time t. Note that in our setting, we only have two such goods (the manufacturing and agriculture composite good) and that we assume a Cobb-Douglas rather than a CES aggregator. This does not matter in the following because we are interested in substitution elasticities at the next lower level of aggregation only. Similar to us, Broda and Weinstein assume that M gt aggregates varieties di¤erentiated by country of origin and that, in addition, the aggregator takes the following nonsymmetric CES form:
where g is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of good g and d 1= g gct denotes a taste or quality parameter for a variety from country c. 47 Associated with this aggregator is the price index:
where p gct is the price charged by country c for good g at time t. From (55), we can derive the following import demand function (expressed as import shares and in log-di¤erences):
where ' gt = ( g 1) ln M gt = M gt 1 and " gct = ln d gct . Broda and Weinstein also allow for an upward-sloping supply curve of the form:
where ! g 0 is the inverse supply elasticity, gt = !g 1+!g ln E gt , E gt is total expenditure on good g at time t in the importing country, and gct = 1 1+!g ln gct captures random changes in the technology factor gct . Crucially for the identi…cation strategy below, Broda and Weinstein further assume that demand and supply shocks are independent, implying E (" gct gct ) = 0.
Supply and demand can be rewritten to eliminate the intercepts ' gt and gt by normalizing with respect to a reference country k: 48
where k ln p gct = ln p gct k ln p gkt , etc. To take advantage of E (" gct gct ) = 0, we multiply the two normalized equations and obtain:
(1+!g)( g 1) . Although u gct = " gct gct is correlated with shares and prices, we can obtain consistent estimates of 1 and 2 by implementing the following between estimator (averaging across periods t):
By the assumption of independence of " gct and gct , we know that E (u gc ) = 0 and thus plim (u gc ) = 0 as the number of periods T approaches in…nity. So the error term in (57) Table 3 ). Agriculture productivity is increased separately for each country and the manufacturing share change in that country is recorded. Solid lines show averages of the resulting change across countries in the lowest, middle and upper tercile of the centrality measure (see (2) and Section 4 for details). Dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals (omitted for the middle tercile). Table 3 ). Solid lines are averages of the resulting share changes for countries in the lowest, middle and upper tercile of comparative advantage in agriculture, respectively, measured as productivity in agriculture divided by productivity in manufacturing (see Section 4) . Dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals (omitted for the middle tercile). Table 3 ). Solid lines are averages of the resulting share changes for countries in the lowest, middle and upper tercile of comparative advantage in agriculture, respectively, measured as productivity in agriculture divided by productivity in manufacturing (see Section 4) . Dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals (omitted for the middle tercile). transformation of a country's share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country's agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in manufacturing (labor productivity is defined as value added per worker, adjusted for cross-country price differences using sector-specific PPP exchange rates -see Section 2 and Appendix B for details). Mindist is the minimum distance (in km) of a country to either of Japan, the European Union (Netherlands) or the USA. CEN is a country's centrality measure (defined in Section 2). All regressorsare in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. For data sources see Appendix A. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Years  2000  2000  2000  2000 1980, 1990, 2000 1980, 1990, 2000 1980, 1990, 2000 1980, 1990, 2000 1980-2005 1980-2005 1980-2005 Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors (clustered at the country-level in columns 5-11) for OLS estimations. The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country's share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country's agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in manufacturing (labor productivity is defined as value added per worker, adjusted for cross-country price differences using sector-specific PPP exchange rates -see Section 2 and Appendix B for details). CEN is a country's centrality measure (defined in Section 2). POP is a country's population size, AP its labor productivity in agriculture and PCGDP its per-capita GDP, respectively. All regressors are in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. For data sources see Appendix A. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS estimations using generated data (see Section 4 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country's share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country's agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country's centrality measure (defined in Section 2). POP is a country's population size, AP its labor productivity in agriculture, and PCGDP its per-capita GDP, respectively. All regressorsare in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS estimations using generated data (see Section 4 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country's share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country's agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country's centrality measure (defined in Section 2). POP is a country's population size, AP its labor productivity in agriculture, and PCGDP its per-capita GDP, respectively. All regressors are in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS estimations using generated data (see Section 4 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country's share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country's agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country's centrality measure (defined in Section 2) and AP its labor productivity in agriculture. All regressors are in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Table displays coefficients and robust standard errors (clustered at the country-level) for OLS estimations using generated data (see Section 4 for details). The dependent variable is the logistic transformation of a country's share of manufacturing in GDP. RELPR is the quotient of a country's agricultural labor productivity and its labor productivity in manufacturing. CEN is a country's centrality measure (defined in Section 2) and AP its labor productivity in agriculture. All regressors are in logs. Results on the included constant are suppressed. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
